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When it comes to supply chain management, it's all
about relationships. Consider the sad story of
Navistar and Ford. Navistar, a Ford supplier since
1982, provides about 225,000 diesel engines
annually for Ford's F-series pickup trucks, and Ford
is Navistar's biggest customer. Ford, in turn, bene-
fits from the recent truck craze through sales of its
high-profit pickups, which are powered by the
Navistar engines. Sounds like a match made in
heaven, right?
Not exactly. About a year ago, Ford decided to
shore up its declining profitability by paying
Navistar $6167 per engine, rather than the agreed-
upon price of $7673, arguing that $6167 was a fairer
price. Needless to say, Navistar didn't agree. Ford
responded with the unprecedented move of debit-
ing the invoices it received from Navistar by
approximately $1500 per engine, resulting in an
annual revenue loss to Navistar of over $300 million.
Ford's apparent assumption was that Navistar would☆ Adapted from Zhao, Huo, Flynn, & Yeung (in press). The
impact of power and relationship commitment on the integration
between manufacturers and customers in a supply chain. Journal
of Operations Management.
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doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2008.01.009cave in and accede to Ford's demands because of the
power that Ford wielded over Navistar.
In true David and Goliath fashion, however,
Navistar fought back, ceasing production of the
engines on February 26, 2007, which resulted in
Ford having to curtail its truck production. Shortly
thereafter, a court-ordered decree forced Navistar
to resume its engine shipments and Ford to pay half
of the amount that it had debited, while both
parties worked out their differences. So did the
little guy win, wielding power of its own?
Nothing is ever that simple. The latest twist is
that Ford recently announced it is building a new
factory in Chihuahua, Mexico, dedicated to 4.4-liter
diesel engines, to be online by late 2009 or 2010.
Navistar is seeking more than $2 billion in damages
from Ford for failing to honor its purchase contract
with Navistar, which runs through 2012, and arguing
that Ford intends to produce an engine that was
actually designed by Navistar.
And it goes on and on. According to the president
of Planning Perspectives:
There is no trust or relationship left between
Ford and Navistar. It's an extreme example of an
adversarial relationship that has evolved. One
has to conclude that Navistar is perceiving that
Ford is taking an opportunistic view towarddiana University. All rights reserved.
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same thing to survive (Pope, 2007).
Is this the sort of relationship you want to have in
your supply chain?
In this article, we examine the topic of customer
power and the effect that it has on supply chain
relationships. Although the Ford and Navistar
example is extreme, the concept of power is alive
and well and living in supply chains everywhere.
Interestingly, however, some of the effects of
customer power are actually beneficial to supply
chain relationships. We will examine different types
of customer power and speculate about the impact
that each has on the relationship between custo-
mers and suppliers. We then report the results of our
research on supply chain power in Chinese supply
chains, which reveals the importance of certain
types of power in establishing an effective supply
chain.2. Customer power
When thinking about customer power, it is useful to
draw upon research about the more general concept
of power. French and Raven (1959) classified power
into five types, and their framework has held up to
extensive testing over the years. When we apply
their classifications to customer power, it provides
us with a useful framework.
2.1. Expert power
Expert power is the power that a customer has,
based on knowledge, expertise, or skills that are
desired by a supplier. For example, Cummins Engine
is a world leader in the use of Six Sigma. Cummins
routinely provides its suppliers with Six Sigma
training and helps them to get started doing their
own Six Sigma projects. Of course, there are
benefits to Cummins as its suppliers use Six Sigma
projects to improve their products and processes;
however, Cummins' provision of Six Sigma training
and expertise is also a powerful incentive for
suppliers to seek to become Cummins suppliers.
They may comply with what they believe to be
Cummins' wishes as they position themselves to
become Cummins suppliers, in order to take
advantage of Cummins' Six Sigma expertise.
2.2. Referent power
Referent power exists when a supplier values
identification with the customer. When you walk
into the lobby of a factory, you are typically greeted
by an array of plaques proudly proclaiming that thefactory is a preferred supplier to Ford or other large,
well-known companies. The assumption is that if a
supplier is good enough to be selected as a preferred
supplier for Ford, it must be pretty good. Through
its potential to provide this credibility to a supplier,
Ford has referent power.
2.3. Legitimate power
Legitimate power is natural power: the supplier
believes that certain customers have a natural right
to influence its actions. Because Ford was Navistar's
only customer, Navistar could conceivably be willing
to comply with Ford's every wish. If Navistar per-
ceived itself to be akin to an extension of Ford, it
might seem that Ford had the natural right to
influence Navistar's decisions. This perception of
legitimate power is typical in suppliers of large,
well-known companies, such as Wal-Mart or Dell.
Notice that all three of these types of power
exist in the eyes of the supplier; they are not
wielded by the customer and, in fact, the customer
may not even be aware that they exist. Because of
this, they are known as non-mediated sources of
power. Non-mediated sources of power are like a
carrot, leading the supplier to be influenced with-
out the customer taking any explicit action. The
supplier, itself, decides how much or whether it will
be influenced by a customer. The supplier is willingly
influenced by a customer because of its perception
of the customer's knowledge or expertise (expert
power), reputation (referent power), or the belief
that the customer has the natural right to influence
it (legitimate power).
In contrast are the types of power known as me-
diated sources of power. These are known to the
customer and are readily exercised, with the
explicit intent of influencing a supplier. Mediated
sources of power are more like a stick that is
wielded by customers to ensure supplier compli-
ance. The customer decides whether, when, and
how to use its power to influence the supplier's
behavior, by creating positive consequences, or
coercing it through negative consequences.
2.4. Reward power
Reward power exists when the customer provides
rewards that are attractive to the supplier. When
the customer is pleased with a supplier, it may
increase the frequency or quantity of its purchases.
Back in 1982, when the relationship began, Ford
rewarded Navistar by providing it with all of its F-
series engine business. If the relationship had
continued on a different tack, a satisfied Ford
might have rewarded Navistar with a contract for
engines for additional models.
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Coercive power exists when the customer has the
ability to provide punishments that are detrimental
to the supplier. This was the situation with Ford and
Navistar. Ford tried to use its power to coerce
Navistar into lowering its engine prices. Navistar
then tried to reverse the balance of coercive power
by shutting down its engine assembly lines.
Customer power is particularly interesting to think
about in China's rapidly emerging economy. China's
national culture is high in power distance, character-
ized by an acceptance of power inequalities. Because
non-mediated power is based on the perception of
the customer's power, rather than its actual exercise,
it is reasonable to expect that expert, referent, and
legitimate power would be strong in China.
Guanxi, which is a behavioral outgrowth of
China's cultural values, is the granting of prefer-
ential treatment to business partners in exchange
for favors and obligations. Not returning a favor
results in a loss of face for both the manager and his
in-group. Because guanxi is based on the expecta-
tion of reciprocity, we anticipate that reward power
will be especially strong in China. However, coercive
power may also be potent, particularly when
employed outside of the in-group.3. Relationship commitment
In a supply chain, power may be an important deter-
minant of relationship commitment, which is an
attitude held by supply chain partners about the
development and maintenance of a stable, long-
lasting, and mutually beneficial relationship. There
are two types of relationship commitment. Norma-
tive relationship commitment is an ongoing rela-
tionship, over an extended period of time, which is
based on mutual commitment and sharing. It's a lot
like a marriage. Imagine a man and a woman who
meet each other and find that they want to spend
increasingly more time together. They learn to trust
each other and eventually commit to each other for
the long term. As they face challenges through the
years, there are the inevitable disagreements;
however, their commitment to each other helps
them work through the issues, and it becomes even
stronger over time.
In contrast, instrumental relationship commit-
ment exists when a supplier accepts the influence
of a customer only because it hopes to receive a
favorable reaction. It's a lot like a relationship that
is based on a woman's attraction to a man based
solely on his money, fame, or good looks. While the
relationship might appear rosy for a while, as soon
as the woman meets someone with more money,more fame, or better looks, she won't hesitate to
abandon her man in favor of another.
It's interesting to think about both types of relation-
ship commitment in the context of a supply chain. A
normative relationship takes longer to establish and
demands greater investment of resources. The payoff
of a long-term, committed relationship is greater for
both the customer and the supplier if they are willing
to put in the requisite effort. In contrast, while an
instrumental relationship may be beneficial to one or
both of the parties in the short term, it will fade away
when the customer or supplier finds a better partner.4. The relationship between customer
power and relationship commitment
So, what does customer power have to do with
relationship commitment? We thought that it might
have a lot to do with it, so we set out to study this
relationship in China. China's cultural collectivism
lays the foundation for normative relationship com-
mitment, where group interests dominate. Members
of collective cultures readily subordinate their
personal goals to those of the group. Normative
relationship commitmentmay be easier to develop in
China, since members of its highly collective culture
experience relatedness to others as a fundamental
part of themselves.
4.1. Customer power and normative
relationship commitment
Expert power in a supply chain is a commitment to
customers that possess knowledge, skills, or exper-
tise that a supplier believes will be beneficial to it.
In China's rapidly developing economy, many sup-
pliers value their relationship with big multinational
customers as a means of learning about how to
compete in the global economy. We believe that this
perception of expert power will cause Chinese
suppliers to strive to establish normative relation-
ships with customers.
Referent power is related to a supplier's identi-
fication with, and internalization of, the goals and
values of a customer. Identification occurs when a
supplier accepts a customer's influence because it
admires the way the customer manages its business;
internalization occurs when a supplier accepts a
customer's influence because it holds values and
norms of behavior that are similar. Identification
and internalization may be especially potent in
China, where power is transferred through inter-
linked guanxi networks. We believe that the
perception of referent power will cause Chinese
suppliers to seek to develop normative relationships
with customers.
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right to influence it and that it is obligated to accept
that influence, the supplier has legitimized the
customer's influence. Because of its perception of
legitimate power, the supplier does not question
actions taken by the customer; it simply complies.
State-owned manufacturing enterprises in China
were historically provided with production sched-
ules by the central government. Despite the fact
that these production schedules were frequently
out of synch with market demand, they were not
questioned, because the central government was
believed to have the natural right to determine the
policies and practices of state-owned enterprises.
Thus, we believe that the perception of the legiti-
mate power of a customer will play an important
role in the desire of a supplier to develop normative
relationship commitment with it.
What about mediated sources of power? They are
inconsistent with normative relationship commit-
ment because they are manipulative by nature. For
example, customers' exercise of reward power
manipulates the supplier through the provision of
rewards for desired behaviors, and coercive power
is exhibited through customers' threats to withdraw
business unless the supplier engages in desired
behaviors. These actions fly in the face of the
trust that is at the heart of normative relationship
commitment, and we believe that the use of reward
and coercive power will be negatively related to
normative relationship commitment.
4.2. Customer power and instrumental
relationship commitment
By its nature, instrumental relationship commit-
ment is based onmanipulation and calculation of the
benefits and costs of a relationship. Thus, we expect
that expert, referent, and legitimate power will be
negatively related to instrumental relationship
commitment; customers which are perceived to
have expert, referent, or legitimate power will be
less likely to be involved in instrumental relation-
ships. The presence of non-mediated sources of
power encourages congruence in values and norms
of behavior between the supplier and the customer,
because the supplier willingly accepts the custo-
mer's influence. This decreases its inclination to
make commitments to customers based on calcula-
tion of short-term financial benefits and costs.
In contrast, we expect that mediated sources of
power will be positively related to instrumental re-
lationship commitment, since the customer's reward
or coercive power provides extrinsic motivation for
commitment. This relationship may be strong in
China because of the importance of guanxi, therewards of which can include access to limited
resources and controlled information; preferential
terms for pricing, contracts, and credit; and protec-
tion from external competitors. Because of guanxi's
obligation to exchange favors with other in-group
members, Chinese suppliers place substantial
weight on customers' anticipated reactions. For
example, if a supplier receives a big order from a
purchasing agent who is a member of his guanxi
network, he is obligated to respondwith a gift, favor,
or concession. If this obligation is not fulfilled within
a short period of time, the guanxi relationship will
become strained, and the social harmony between
the managers will be disturbed because the supply-
ing manager has lost face. Thus, we expect that the
use of reward power will foster stronger instru-
mental relationship commitment.
Similarly, a customer may use coercive power to
pressure a supplier to comply with its requirements,
thereby increasing the supplier's instrumental rela-
tionship commitment. If there is no guanxi between
supply chain partners, there is no obligation. In fact,
there is even something known as instrumental
guanxi, which exists in temporary, impersonal ties
that are based on transactional relationships. When
the need for the relationship ceases to exist, so does
the guanxi, and in a relationship without guanxi,
Chinese managers will readily exploit their part-
ners. Because the pervasiveness of guanxi makes
the use of coercive power seem natural in China, we
believe that a supplier's instrumental relationship
commitment will be positively related to its
perception of its customer's coercive power.5. Research study
In order to study customer power and its effect on
supply chain relationships in China, we contacted
4569 companies. Since China is very large, with
uneven economic development across regions, we
strategically selected five important industrial cities
to analyze to provide geographic and economic
diversity. Shanghai represents the Yangtze River
Delta, which has China's highest GDP per capita,
and Guangzhou represents the Pearl River Delta, with
China's second highest GDP per capita. Both are
located in southeastern China, which has the highest
degree of marketization and economic reform.
Tianjin represents the Bohai Sea Economic area and
reflects an average level of economic reform and
marketization. Chongqing, located in the southwest,
represents a lower stage of economic reform and
marketization. We also included Hong Kong; although
most Hong Kong companies maintain manufacturing
facilities in mainland China, they operate in a very
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agreed to receive our questionnaire, and 617 usable
questionnaires were returned.
We borrowed the measures of power and rela-
tionship commitment from prior research, which
had developed reliable and valid measures. Some
other measures had not been well documented and
tested previously, so we developed new items for
them based on the literature, observations during
company visits, and interviews with supply chain
professionals. We tested the questionnaire with
supply chain professionals, in order to make sure
that the questions were understandable and rele-
vant to practices in China. After the questionnaires
were returned, we performed a series of analyses to
make sure that the measures we used were reliable
and valid.
Although French and Raven's research on power
was done in 1959 and there have been numerous
studies that used their measures, there have been
few research studies on power conducted in China.
Because of this, we started out by looking at the
power construct, so that we could see whether it fell
into the same five dimensions (expert, referent,
legitimate, reward, and coercive) in China as it does
in Western countries. We used factor analysis to sort
the items into groups that represented the same
dimensions, with some interesting results. We found
that power could be grouped into either four or five
dimensions. When the power items were grouped
into four dimensions, the reward power items were
split. Half of them loaded on the same factor as the
items for legitimate power, while the other half
loaded on the same dimension as the items for
coercive power. This was conceptually difficult toFigure 1 Relationship between power, relationsexplain, so we used the five dimension result, which
was also acceptable, in our analysis. We also tried to
force all of the items into two dimensions, to test
whether the mediated/non-mediated split would
hold in China. Again, the results were difficult to
interpret, with the reward power items split
between the two dimensions. Thus, we did not find
a good reason to collapse the five dimensions into
the two dimensions often used in Western research,
and found that reward power may function differ-
ently in China. We used structural equation model-
ing to examine the relationship between the
measures, and our results are shown in Figure 1,
where solid lines indicate significant positive rela-
tionships and dashed lines indicate significant
negative relationships. Both expert and referent
power had a positive impact on normative relation-
ship commitment, but legitimate power did not.
None of the non-mediated types of power was
related to instrumental relationship commitment.
In other words, although the expert and referent
power of customers enhances suppliers' commit-
ment normatively, customers do not choose to
exercise it in an instrumental way. When a supplier
accepts its customer's influence because of the
customer's specialized knowledge and expertise or
reputation, it learns from the customer. This fosters
identification with and internalization of the custo-
mer's values and norms, enhancing normative
relationship commitment, but does not significantly
influence instrumental relationship commitment.
The impact of expert power on normative relation-
ship commitment indicates that Chinese managers
have strong respect for knowledge and authority,
combined with a powerful desire to learn.hip commitment, and supply chain integration
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either type of relationship commitment. There are
several reasons for this. First, the customer's
natural right to influence a supplier is universally
accepted in China, so this source of power is not
related to any unique characteristics of the custo-
mer. Although legitimate power is strong, it is
pervasive and does not particularly influence
relationship commitment. Second, China's collec-
tive culture, combined with the existence of guanxi
networks, causes the power base to shift from the
natural rights of the customer to in-group vs. out-
group differences in the extended guanxi network.
Customers aren't perceived as having power by
natural right; rather, the perception of power
derives from whether or not the customer is in the
in-group in the supplier's extended guanxi network.
Thus, the influence of a customer, merely by virtue
of being a customer, is not significant.
What about mediated sources of power? Coercive
power behaved according to our expectations. It
was positively related to instrumental relationship
commitment, but negatively related to normative
relationship commitment. Thus, coercion plays a
significant role in instrumental relationship com-
mitment, but it is associated with lower levels of
normative relationship commitment.
Reward power, on the other hand, had a positive
impact on both normative and instrumental rela-
tionship commitment. In both China and the West,
reward power brings the instrumental relationship
commitment of supply chain partners. However, it
also improves normative relationship commitment
in China. If the customer does not reward a supplier
for its good performance, the supplier's trust and
normative relationship commitment will decrease.
In contrast, when the customer uses reward power
to meet the supplier's expectation of reciprocity,
normative relationship commitment is further
enhanced. Therefore, we conclude that reward
power plays a very different role in Chinese culture,
compared with Western cultures. This was sup-
ported by our analysis of the two dimension
solution, where the loadings for reward power
were split between the dimensions for mediated
and non-mediated power.
We also looked at the impact of relationship com-
mitment on supply chain integration. Supply chain
integration is the extent to which an organization
strategically collaborates with its supply chain part-
ners and manages intra- and inter-organization pro-cesses to achieve effective and efficient flows of
products, service, information, money, and decisions,
with the objective of providing maximum value to its
customers. Benefits arise from managing a supply
chain as a single system, rather than individually
optimizing fragmented subsystems, which involves
information sharing; planning; coordination; and
controlling materials, parts, and finished goods at
the strategic, tactical, and operational levels. Not
surprisingly, we found that normative relationship
commitment had a positive impact on supply chain
integration and instrumental relationship commit-
ment was not related to supply chain integration.
Thus, suppliers should cultivate normative rela-
tionship commitment with their customers, in order
to enhance supply chain integration, which previous
research has shown to be vital in achieving a
competitive advantage and enhancing performance.
Committed customers and suppliers cooperate with
each other, sharing information and integrating
inter-organizational processes. When supply chain
partners have an intrinsic desire to continue a
relationship, supply chain integration can be
achieved more readily. In contrast, instrumental
relationship commitment does not have any sig-
nificant influence on supply chain integration, due
to its short-term and loose nature. Therefore,
suppliers should refrain from cultivating instrumen-
tal relationship commitment, because it has no
effect on supply chain integration and may actually
damage shared values and norms in the long run.
Getting back to where we started: it's all about
relationships. Imagine how the Ford and Navistar
story might have turned out differently, had the
parties enjoyed the sort of commitment and trust
that provided a foundation for working out their
differences. Instead, each of the parties is spending
enormous sums of money on suits and countersuits,
building new factories, and finding new business. As
you establish and develop a relationship with a
supply chain partner, would you rather it be more
like a happy marriage or an ugly divorce?References
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